Foreign Relations/World Affairs ... Politics ...
Ever since the election, our nation’s top leaders have adopted a mantra regarding the situation in Iraq: “a fresh approach”. Unfortunately, no one can determine just what that approach is. Former Secretary of State Jim Baker and his Iraq Study Group recommend easing our combat troops out while keeping some troops in Iraq to train and support the national army, together with urging Syria and Iran to do whatever they can to calm things down between the Sunnis and Shiites. OK, who else out there is old enough to remember the phrase “Vietnamization”? President Bush agrees that a fresh approach is needed, but disagrees with Baker. He doesn’t have any other ideas, though, so for now he’s continuing with the same old approach that has worked so poorly.
In my opinion, the main problem isn’t what the United States is or isn’t doing in Iraq. The heart of the problem is that there isn’t enough interest amidst the current occupants of Iraq in maintaining a unified nation. There doesn’t appear to be an Abraham Lincoln, inspiring the masses to suffer greatly for the cause of reunification; not even for a weak “federalized” version of nationhood. The center cannot hold.
There’s an article in todays NY Times by Roger Cohen entitled Iraq’s Biggest Failing: There Is No Iraq. I think it’s fair to say that Mr. Cohen basically agrees with what I just said. Mr. Cohen, however, ends his insightful article urging the United States to keep on trying to put a unified and viable Iraqi government in place. Otherwise, there could be a blood-bath in Baghdad, and the Sunnis would get stuck with a dirt-poor desert province that would make a wonderful headquarters and training site for Al Qaeda and other international jihad terror groups. Unfortunately, Mr. Cohen didn’t have any “fresh approach” suggestions as to how to accomplish this. I suppose that he agrees with Mr. Bush, i.e. stick it out, take your lumps, and hope to eventually get a lucky break.
Personally, I don’t see any hope of a lucky break in the offing right now. Civil war situations usually end only after a whole lot of destruction and bloodshed causes exhaustion on both sides. Hopefully, the exhaustion is of equal magnitude and both sides set up a compromise that prevents further warfare (although preventing growth and development for many decades). Examples: Yugoslavia and Cyprus. When one side wins decisively (as in the United States), the underlying issues may fester for the next century or so. Sometimes the break-up option is the best of a series of bad choices. It’s looking more and more like that in Iraq.
It seems to me, though, that there is a possibility to break Iraq up in a way that might avoid the worst of the downsides. The USA would have to be the dealmaker, and our hands would be dirty from it; but at this point, how can the USA come out with clean hands?
The deal is this: Let the Shiites have their own nation in the south east, and let them do what they will with Iran. All we could do about that would be to offer continued economic assistance, especially with regard to restoring their oil infrastructure. If they could feed their people and otherwise support themselves economically, they wouldn’t need to suck up to Iran. Although both Iran and Shia Mesopotamia share the same religious sect, there is still a strong line of cleavage, i.e. ethnicity. Arab Shia don’t necessarily want to be puppets of Persian Shia. With some quiet US assistance, perhaps they wouldn’t have to.
As to the Sunnis and the Kurds, here’s the deal. The Kurds would love to declare an independent Kurdistan and gain US recognition and continued support. They also have lots of oil and could get by economically. The USA would benefit from having another friend in the Islamic Middle East; perhaps over time, we could help secularize and modernize their ways. I.e. we could still set up the model Islamic democracy that we hoped Iraq overall would be, only a bit smaller. We’d hopefully get favorable treatment in buying their oil, and they’d probably let us keep some US troops there to support their national army. They’d probably let us keep some special forces active there, quietly carrying out pro-active anti-terrorist operations. Turkey would get nervous about a strong Kurdistan, but we have a door open with the Turks; with some old-fashioned diplomacy and economic assistance, I’m sure we could keep them in line. So overall, the USA would still come out with some real benefits from the whole Iraqi campaign.
But OK, then what about the Sunnis? They get the dirty end of the stick, out in the western provinces without oil. What keeps them from supporting terrorism against the new Kurdistan, and against the West in general (via Al Qaeda)? Well, here’s where the deal gets tough – but not impossible. Suppose we told the Kurds that we’d fully support their immediate independence, if they agreed to take in the Sunnis? I.e., if they agreed to some form of weak federalism with the Sunni province, mainly as a means to share their oil revenues with them? That would be our catch. The Kurds can have nationhood now; the USA would immediately drop its efforts to keep the zombie of federal Iraq alive. But the Kurds would have to share enough of their wealth to keep the Sunnis from going over to the dark side. The USA would obviously get stuck with part of that bill; the Kurds would demand assurances of long-term aid of the same magnitude that we now support Israel with. And the Turks would exact their price too. It would be expensive for us. But fighting a losing war in the Middle East is also expensive.
Let me spell out, one more time, the benefits to the USA of such a deal, however expensive: We get another friendly Islamic nation, one that might be willing to be tutored in the ways of modern Western values. We get another friendly Middle Eastern oil seller. We get to keep some troops in the region, though not in a combat role; this keeps Iran and Syria just a little bit nervous, which is good. We give the Sunnis a line of cash flow, in return for their not sponsoring a jihadist carnival in Anbar. And we quietly keep special force troops active in their backyard, to make sure that they don’t.
OK, but as to Baghdad – that’s still a time bomb that needs to be defused. In the end, I think we want to draw the borders such that Baghdad could be split, half to the Shia nation, half to the Kurd-Sunni federation. Families would need to migrate to the correct sides of the dividing line (which they are already doing). But over the next few years, troops would admittedly be needed there to avoid massive violence. They should be international troops, working under a UN mandate. I say that we go back to the UN and arm-twist the French and Germans and Russians and Arab states to support a Baghdad stabilization mission as part of our end-game. Yes, we’d have to eat some crow and go back to good old fashioned diplomacy, as was practiced before the current Mr. Bush (he could check in with his father about that). But if it were done right, I think that everybody would come out with something. For example, the French and Germans would be allowed to keep their smug “I told you so” attitude.
I’m not imagining that this deal would be perfect. There would still be plenty of violence and set backs. But it seems to me to be the one scenario that gives the USA a real chance of gaining half a loaf. If we stay the current course (despite a few so-called “fresh approaches”) and try to gain the whole loaf of a stabilized, united Iraq, the chances seem very good of losing everything; and not so good for gaining anything.
That’s my two cents. The window for such a deal is probably short. The Bush administration would have to swallow a lot of pride. But it might save the historical remembrance of Mr. Bush’s presidency from the disaster category.